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  This paper analyzes the dividend payout by Romanian companies listed on the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange in connection with the changes in corporate taxes. If the 
tax burden on corporate gross incomes is increasing, the companies’ management can 
follow two reasons in deciding the dividend payout: to allocate more for investments, or 
to increase the dividend ratio. Each of these decisions can be argued based on 
Corporate Finance principles, depending on the management objectives. This paper 
found no significant correlation between the dividend policy and the corporate tax 
burden. However, the dividend payout reacted when the regulations related to the tax 
treatment of incomes were changed in 2005. Moreover, the dividend policy seems to 
be sensitive to the ownership structure, which can be explained by the impact of some 
agency problems.  
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the companies’ behaviour of dividend 
payout as a reaction to changes in the corporate income tax rate for emergent 
markets, with a study case of Romania. The main trend in the financial theory states 
that taxes have an impact on financial decisions even if these decisions are taken by 
investors or by companies. From this perspective, if tax regulations are changed, it 
means that rational investors have to change their behaviour. The empirical studies 
related to this subject diverge in very large areas. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the government is interested to establish the 
most appropriate policies, which can alternate between economic performance and 
social protection, in order to reach the confidence of voters. For example, Diamond 
and Mirrless (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) confirmed the relationship 
between taxes, social efficiency and fairness. Subsequently, Le Grand (1987) stated 
the relevance of fairness as a principal objective in the economic system, from the 
perspective of optimal taxation.  
From a microeconomic perspective, the mainstream switches from identifying an 
optimal financial structure or dividend payout, as long as taxes are taken into account 
(see Modigliani and Miller, 1963, respectively, Miller and Modigliani, 1961) to provide 
evidence for dividend payout changes when dividend tax rate is changed (Poterba and 
Summers, 1985). 
Normative models revealed an impact of tax changes on financial decisions, but the 
empirical evidence has different results for developed and emerging markets. For 
developed countries, the results generally stated an adjustment in the behaviour of 
companies and investors subsequent to changes in tax regulations. However, studies 
related to ex-communist East-European countries are relatively fewer (Purfield, 2003; 
Fugaru, 2004).  
Romania represents one of the richest fields of study, as long as specific regulations 
have changed to a great extent, and very often, during the period 1998-2006. These 
changes are presented in Appendix 1. They refer not only to tax rates, but also to some 
tax incentives and exemptions stipulated by many regulations. For this reason, this 
study considered the entire level of tax burden, and not only the corporate tax rate 
levels.  
In fact, based on dividend payout, the behaviour of listed companies can be 
distinguished relative to consumption or to investments. Thus, a higher dividend ratio 
can be translated as a decision oriented to consumption. On the other hand, a lower 
dividend ratio can be explained by a preference for future economic growth, taking into 
consideration not only tangible and intangible assets, but also investments in human 
resources, namely managers’ and employees’ incentives.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, two alternative reactions to 
dividend payout decision as a result of the changes in tax regulation are presented; 
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Section 3 presents the database and methodology of the study. Sections 4 and 5 
include the numerical results and the main conclusions of the study.  
2. Two alternative reactions of dividend policies to 
changes in tax treatment 
Dividend Payout Policy remains one of the main issues in Corporate Finance. Starting 
from the seminal paper of Miller and Modigliani (1961), with their Irrelevance Theory, 
many researchers in Finance tried to explain why firms pay dividends and to search for 
an optimal dividend policy. From a methodological point of view, there are, at least, 
four additional issues that have an influence on dividend policy: (i) agency costs, (ii) 
asymmetrical information between inside and outside shareholders, (iii) some 
characteristic features in shareholders’ behaviour, and (iv) taxes. Each of these issues 
tried to explain why the Irrelevance Theory does not occur in practice and the 
mainstream of financial studies switched from one explanation to another, at different 
moments of time (Dragotă, 2003).  
Taxation represents one of the main explanations for dividend policy. Here, on a long 
list of studies, Farrar and Selwyn (1967), Brennan (1970), Miller (1977), Pettit (1977), 
Crockett and Friend (1988), etc., can be mentioned. For example, for the US case, 
Farrar and Selwyn (1967) stated that rational investors have to avoid dividend 
payments as long as dividends are taxed more than capital gains. However, Crockett 
and Friend (1988) found out that the US companies paid large amounts as dividends.  
The evidences related to this issue do not offer a certain answer: some studies 
illustrated that companies are really sensitive to this difference in tax treatment of 
dividends and capital gains (see Elton and Gruber, 1970; Lintzerberger and 
Ramaswamy, 1979; Blume, 1980; Gordon and Bradford, 1980; Peterson et al., 1985, 
etc.). For the UK case, Poterba and Summers (1985) demonstrated that there is a 
positive correlation between dividend payments and specific taxation. On the other 
hand, the empirical evidences of Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and Scholes (1982), 
Crockett and Friend (1988), Kalay and Michaely (2000), etc., rejected this hypothesis 
for the US case. More recently, in the US case, Chetty and Saez (2005) revealed 
switches in the dividend payments when the dividend tax decreased from a maximum 
of 35% in 2003, to 15%. On the other hand, Blouin et al. (2004) revealed changes in 
the dividend policy caused by taxation only for few companies, and more for special 
dividends than for the regular ones. In the same context, a very interesting study on 
Australia is that of Pattenden and Twite (2008). 
When income tax burden rises, the top level management or controller shareholders 
can rationally argue any kind of dividend policy, to decide an increase in the dividend 
payout rate or a decrease in the dividend payout rate
5, respectively. Each of these 
                                                           
5 From a legal point of view, the dividend policy is decided by shareholders. In fact, in the 
Romanian case, and in that of many ex-communist countries, most of the listed companies are 
owned by a larger shareholder, who detains more than 50% of the issued shares (see Dragotă, 
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decisions can be considered as appropriate, depending on circumstances or some 
cultural or economic peculiarities, as discussed further. 
A decrease in the dividend payout rate as an effect of an increase in the tax burden 
can be argued by the interest to insure a larger amount for investments. As long as in 
the case of emergent markets investment opportunities are substantial, the 
management can be tempted to use any available financial resource in order to sustain 
the future growth (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). In compensation, managers should 
decrease the dividend payout rate from q to q
’, with q> q
’. Of course, this decrease in 
the dividend payout rate, equal to (q – q
’) should be explained as an expropriation of 
shareholders’ wealth, at least for the present moment, equal to (q – q
’) · NEG, where 
NEG represents net incomes. Of course, the assertion of this policy is that the incomes 
invested at this moment will produce higher future incomes, resulting in future 
increases in dividends.  
On the other hand, in the context of agency problems, a decrease in the dividend 
payout rate can be explained as a lack of minority shareholders’ protection (see La 
Porta et al., 1998, among others). Therefore, controller shareholders can obtain other 
private benefits than dividends. Thus, they can accept a minimal amount as dividends 
as long as they can obtain private benefits from other sources. On the contrary, 
minority shareholders are strictly compensated by dividends. Even if they might benefit 
from capital gains, these ones are uncertain as long as the investors have no signal of 
the companies’ performances (see Easterbrook, 1984). From this point of view, for the 
Romanian case, some indicators can be very relevant, too. For instance, from 2382 
companies listed on Romanian capital market (on all its components) in July 2007, only 
53 paid dividends in the previous year, which means 2.22%. We notice that some 
companies preferred to offer stock dividends to shareholders, but this is not a real form 
of payment, as long as no cash is paid to shareholders.  
From this general perspective, as long as companies have to signal their good 
behaviour, an increase in the dividend payout ratio should be understood as a proof of 
the management concern to protect minority shareholders’ interests. Since the 
management has less available financial resources (a lower level of net incomes), it is 
forced to choose between cutting off some dividend payments or some investment 
expenditures. We notice that, in the specific context of the dividend policy analysis, 
these decisions can be interpreted both as an increase in the larger shareholders’ 
private benefits and as a lack of interest in the future of the company.  
Similar considerations can be made for a decrease in the tax burden. The 
management can change the destination of these additional funds to increase dividend 
payments or to increase investments expenditures. Depending on the sign and the 
magnitude of these changes in the dividend payout ratio, it becomes obvious if the 
management is more concerned about the future growth or about signalling a good 
treatment to the minority shareholders.  
These two reasons can be presented by the controller shareholders, whether they 
follow the objective of maximizing the shareholders’ wealth or not. For example, under 
the claim of “retain incomes for future investments, in order to increase the market 
value of the companies”, some expenditures made in the controller shareholders’ own 
interest can be covered. This policy can be taken into account especially in the ex-Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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communist countries’ cases. Interesting investment projects can be found relatively 
easy in transition economies, as long as these economies are underdeveloped. Since 
the financial markets are immature, too, the incomes retained are an important 
financial resource, so companies are not able to accept dividend payments. These 
arguments can be sustained credibly by managers or controller shareholders as long 
as future projects are discussed, and their performance is difficult to quantify at the 
present moment.  
3. Database and methodology 
The most important aim of this study was to analyze the influence of corporate taxation 
on dividend policy for the Romanian listed companies. An additional objective was to 
find out other determinants for the Romanian companies’ dividend policy. The seminal 
work in this field is Lintner (1956), who found out that firms establish their dividends in 
accordance with the current level of incomes, as well as to the previous year dividend. 
Also, Fama and Babiak (1968) identified an impact of previous incomes on current 
dividends.  
The variables used in this study are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Variables for dividend policies of the Romanian firms 
Variables Symbol  Description 
Dividend payment  DIV  Reported  by  companies. According to the 
Romanian law, a company can pay dividends 
only if it obtains positive earnings.  
Gross income  GRE  Reported by companies. 
Net income  NEG  Reported by companies. 
Corporate tax burden  CTB  Estimated by the difference between gross and 
net incomes. The corporate income tax cannot 
be correctly estimated by applying the 
proportional rate, because the accounting 
earnings (GRE) are different from the taxable 
earnings (due to some facilities, exemptions, 
etc.). 
Market capitalization  MKC  Data from www.ktd.ro (for closing market prices), 
completed with the official site of Bucharest 
Stock Exchange (www.bvb.ro) (for the number of 
shares). 
Market-to-book ratio  MBR  Calculated as the ratio between market 
capitalization and total assets. 
GDP real growth rate 
(%) 
GDP  Calculated as Gross Domestic Product growth 
rate.  
Total debts  DBT  Reported by companies. 
Total assets  AST  Reported by companies. 
Companies  controlled  by  PAS  Dummy variable equal to 1 when employees’  Income Taxation Regulation 
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Variables Symbol  Description 
employees’ 
organizations  
organizations had the control and equal to 0 if 
not. PAS are employees’ organizations resulted
as an effect of the mass privatization process by 
MEBO (Managers Employees Buy-Out) method. 
Through this process, managers and employees 
received shares of the companies where they 
were employed. They received a “credit” from the 
Romanian State to pay back for these shares, 
through dividends received by PAS 
organizations.  
Companies controlled by 
the state 
GOV  Dummy variable was equal to 1 when the state 
had the control and equal to 0 if not. The most 
important reason for taking this variable into 
account is given by the persistence of the 
Romanian State Property since 1989, the year of 
the Romanian anti-communist Revolution.   
Market index ratio  MIR  Returns (%) of the market index BET, calculated 
yearly (website www.bvb.ro). BET includes the 
most 10 liquid assets on the market.  
Changes in corporate 




Dummy variable was equal to 0 until the year 
2000 and equal to 1 for the period 2001-2005. 
Changes in corporate 
income tax rate at the 




Dummy variable was equal to 0 until the 
beginning of the year 2005 and equal to 1 for the 
period after 2005. 
Ownership  structure  DUM3  Dummy variable equal to 1 for the companies 
with more than 50% shares owned by one 
controller shareholder and equal to 0 for the 
other companies.  
Data from: 
www.bvb.ro –Website of Bucharest Stock Exchange 
www.mfinante.ro – Website of the Romanian Ministry of Finance 
www.ktd.ro – Website of the Investments Consulting Company KTD Invest SA. 
 
The database includes financial information for 65 listed companies at the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange (I and II tiers), for the period 1998-2005. Only the financial years with 
profit were taken into account. Some descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 2. 
Taking into account also the lack of available relevant information, just a number of 37 
- 41 firms were used in regressions (see Table 2).  








 Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 1/2009  82 
   
where t = 1, …, T (time period), i = 1,…, N cross-section observation unit in the 
sample, k = 1, …, M (explanatory variables). βk are the parameters that will be 
estimated.  αi  is the individual effect, which is assumed to be constant in time and 
specific for the individual cross-section unit in the fixed effects model. εit is a stochastic 
error term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance.  
  Six regressions were used, respectively: 
∆Ln(DIVit) = αi + β1 · ∆Ln(CTBit) + β2 · ∆Ln(GREit) + β3 · Ln(DIV)i, t-1 + β4 · GDPt + β5 
· PASit + β6 · GOVit + β7 · DUM1 + β8 · DUM2 + εit       (1) 
∆Ln(DIVit) = αi + β1 · ∆Ln(CTBit) + β2 · Ln(DIV)i, t-1 + β3 · ∆Ln(ASTit) + β4 · 
∆Ln(MKCit) +β5 · MIRt + β6 · PASit + β7 · GOVit + β8 · DUM1 + β9 · DUM2 + εit  (2) 
∆Ln(DIVit) = αi + β1 · Ln(DIV)i, t-1 + β2 · ∆Ln(ASTit) + β3 · ∆Ln(MKCit) + β4· 
∆Ln(DBTit) + εit           ( 3 )  
∆Ln(DIVit) = αi + β1 · Ln(DIV)i, t-1 + β2 · PASit + β3 · GOVit + β4 · DUM1 + β5 · DUM2 
+ εit             ( 4 )  
∆Ln(DIVit) = αi + β1 · ∆Ln(GREit) + β2 · Ln(DIV)i, t-1 + β3 · ∆Ln(ASTit) + β4 · 
∆Ln(MKCit) + β5 · ∆Ln(DBTit) +  β6 · GDPt  + β7 · PASit + β8 · GOVit + β9 · DUM1 + 
β10 · DUM2 + εit           ( 5 )  
∆Ln(DIVit) = αi + β1 · ∆Ln(GREit) + β2 · Ln(DIV)i, t-1 + β3 · ∆Ln(ASTit) + β4 · 
∆Ln(MKCit) + β5 · PASit + β6 ·DUM2 + β7 ·DUM3 + εit       (6)   
 
The starting point of the first equation is the Lintner (1956) model, but we included the 
impact of taxes and some dummies in order to explain some specific features of the 
Romanian capital market. Comparatively to the Lintner model, we considered the 
variation of the logarithm of dividends, in order to normalize the data series. The 
second equation includes more variables. However, we excluded the gross income 
variable (∆Ln(GREit)) in order to avoid multicollinearity, and we included the market 
index ratio (MIR) as control variable. The third equation presents the impact of the 
determinants of dividend payout, excluding the dummies. The fourth equation took into 
account the previous dividend and each dummy as an explanatory variable. The fifth 
equation contains all the explanatory variables, without taxation. Finally, the sixth 
equation included most of the variables used before, but added a supplementary 
dummy for the ownership structure.   Income Taxation Regulation 
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4. Empirical results 
In order to identify the size and the direction of the impact of tax changes on dividend 
policy, we analyzed both the dependence between dividend payout ratio and the rate 
of retained incomes, and fiscal burden from corporate income tax. Since the results of 
this first study were not statistically significant, other explanatory variables were taken 
into account (presented in Table 1). 
Three types of variables were considered, as follows: reported values, variables per 
share, respectively, variables per assets. Although the results had the same economic 
interpretation, the first set of variables was chosen, due to the greater statistical 
significance. The reported values for corporate income tax burden (CTB), gross 
income (GRE), dividend payment (DIV), total assets (AST), market capitalization 
(MKC) and total debts (DBT) were transformed in logarithmic values in order to 
normalize the data series and, after that, they were expressed as logarithmic 
differences equivalent to the  growth rate of the variable.  
The results for the period 1999-2005 are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Pool OLS Regressions Testing for the Determinants of Dividend Policy 
for the Romanian Listed Companies over the period 1999-2005  
The variation of logarithm of dividend (∆Ln(DIV)) is the dependent variable 
Equation  Equ. (1)  Equ. (2)  Equ. (3)  Equ. (4)  Equ. (5)  Equ. (6) 
No. of obs.   175  154 174 196 161  164
∆Ln(CTB) 
(Corporate 
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T-values are in parenthesis. 
***, 
** and 
* indicated values are significant at 1%, 5% and, 
respectively, 10% level. 
 
The results of the panel regression with fixed-effects disclosed that there are strong 
individual firm effects in the sample (see Appendix 3). The results in column (1) reveal 
a negative impact of corporate income tax burden on dividends payout, but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. The gross income coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant, as in the similar studies mentioned above (see Lintner, 1956; 
Fama and Babiak, 1968, etc.). The coefficients for the first lag dividends have a 
significant negative impact on dividends growth. This result is very difficult to be 
explained on the basis of previous studies of Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968), 
etc. Theoretically, managers are tracking for a “target dividend”, so a positive 
relationship between Divt and Divt-1 should be reported. The results of this study reveal 
some question marks related to the controller shareholders’ interest in insuring a sound 
dividend policy, or in insuring a good treatment of the minority shareholders, which is 
consistent to the previous studies (see Dragotă, 2006; Dragotă et al., 2007).  
As control variables for business cycles we used alternatively the market index ratio 
(MIR) and the GDP growth rate. Both revealed a negative influence on dividend 
payout. Moreover, the GDP coefficient is strongly significant. From this perspective, a 
GDP growth can imply an additional demand, which means that firms can be interested 
to invest more in order to raise their production. This hypothesis is in accordance with 
Walter (1956), that is “the greater is the profitability, more likely management is – in the 
interest of rapid expansion – to retain a substantial percentage of incomes”. The 
decision to decrease, or even to cut off the dividend payments, can be explained by the  Income Taxation Regulation 
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fact that the retained incomes are an important source for investments and the minority 
shareholders have a little influence on the dividend policy. This conclusion is in 
accordance with Dragotă and Semenescu (2006), which concluded that equity is the 
main financial resource for the Romanian listed companies. The median values of 
equity as a proportion in total assets varied between a minimum of 59.7% in 1999 and 
a maximum of 69.9% in 2005. When the economy is in recession, a decrease in the 
private and public demand reduces the corporate income. Thus, the companies, 
having financial resources, but lower demand for their products and services, can 
decide to pay dividends and to decrease investments.  
The dummy variables (PAS, GOV, DUM1, DUM2, and DUM3), which were used in 
order to explain the payout policy of the Romanian companies, were significant, too. 
The PAS variable indicated the presence of PAS organizations, as a controller 
shareholder. Taking into account their main characteristics (as described in Table 1), 
the interest for a larger dividend payout can be easily explained. Another important 
factor that influenced the dividend payout is the presence of the Romanian State 
(GOV) as a shareholder, which is a characteristic of the ex-communist countries. The 
Romanian State presence produced a decrease in dividend payouts. Moreover, the 
ownership structure (quantified by DUM3) had an influence on dividend payments 
decision. This result is concordant with the previous study of Dragotă (2006).  
The variables DUM1 and DUM2 were used to consider the moments when changes in 
the corporate income tax rate occurred, that is in the years 2000 and 2005. Therefore, 
we analysed if the changes in tax regulations can have an impact at the moment they 
were applied. Interestingly, only the moment when corporate income tax changed at 
the beginning of the year 2005 (DUM2) had a significant effect on the dividend 
payments. This reaction can be further interpreted as a psychological one. Indeed, the 
firms have changed their dividend policy, but not all of them in the same direction. 
Somehow, the companies understood they had to change their dividend policy, but 
their reaction was different from case to case. One explanation can be a different view 
on the impact of taxation, but another one can be that taxation can produce different 
results from one company to another. This result questioned the impact of some fiscal 
policies oriented to companies in developing economies, like Romania.  
The second regression model in Table 2 included more variables, as in Fama and 
Babiak (1968), and Charitou and Vafeas (1998), among others. Thus, variables like 
total assets, market capitalization and total debts were taken into consideration. For 
these variables positive coefficients were obtained, but not statistically significant. We 
avoided the insertion of income and corporate income tax burden in the same 
regression because of their strong correlation (see Table 3). 
In general, dividend policy is also related to the capital structure. For this reason, an 
increase in the tax burden can have no influence on the dividend policy, because the 
managers found the solution of changing the capital structure as long as they can 
obtain financial resources from debts. However, this implication is not validated for the 
Romanian capital market: debts are not a relevant factor for the dividend policy of the 
Romanian listed companies.  Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 1/2009  86 
   
Regressions (3), (4) and (5) revealed different results because of taking into account 
different control and dummy variables. R
2 varied from 24% to 32%, so R
2 was not 
significantly influenced by them. 
Regression (6) was used in order to emphasize the impact of the ownership structure 
on the dividend policy. In accordance with the previous studies relative to the dividend 
policy of the Romanian listed companies (see Dragotă, 2006), the ownership structure 
has an influence on dividend policy. As long as companies are controlled by one 
powerful shareholder, the dividend policy is characterised by a lower dividend ratio. In 
fact, agency problems seem to have a more powerful explanation for dividend 
payments than taxation. Moreover, the ownership structure for the Romanian listed 
companies is very concentrated. Most of the Romanian companies, including the listed 
ones, are controlled by one or more significant shareholders, who hold more than 50% 
of equity. In these conditions, the dividend policy can practically be decided by only 
one or very few persons. The closed end funds can be mentioned as exceptions, which 
can have a different dividend policy, mainly oriented to payments to shareholders.  
Table 3 provides a pairwise correlation analysis of the variables used in the regression 
model.  
Table 3  




















































































∆Ln(CTB)  1                 
Ln(DIV)t-1  0.008  1                
∆Ln(GRE)  0.696  0.045  1               
∆Ln(AST)  0.118  0.042  0.161  1              
∆Ln(MKC) 0.113 0.060 0.124 0.017 1               
∆Ln(DBT) 0.078 0.101 0.139 0.327 0.027 1             
MIR 0.122  -0.075  -0.032  -0.046 0.102  0.019  1        
GDP  0.037 -0.072  -0.107  -0.114 0.156 -0.046 0.575  1         
PAS -0.04  0.108  -0.048  -0.008 -0.034 -0.012  -0.018  -0.035 1      
GOV  0.08  0.023 0.096 0.022 0.01  0.063  -0.033 -0.056 -0.02  1     
DUM1  -0.045  -0.047  -0.046  -0.119 0.078 -0.113 0.317  0.088 -0.03  -0.05  1   
DUM2 -0.239  -0.115  -0.141  -0.219 -0.074 -0.052  -0.279  0.095  -0.04  -0.05  0.218  1 
DUM3  0.028  -0.032  -0.022  0.002  -0.066 0.064 0.179 0.272  0.034  -0.04 0.188 0.041 
 
Based on the results in Table 3, it is unlikely that multicollinearity can be an issue in the 
regression analysis. The relatively high positive correlation between the gross income 
(GRE) and the corporate income tax burden (CTB) was taken into consideration when 
we built the regressions 2-6.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the effects of tax reform on the 
dividend policy for the Romanian listed companies. The changes in income taxation  Income Taxation Regulation 
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provide a rich testing ground for the influence of tax reforms on dividend policy. Some 
non-tax control variables, like assets, market capitalization, debts and, also, GDP 
growth rate and market index, which might affect the corporate dividend payout, were 
analyzed, too. These variables increased the power of the regression tests and led to 
more significant results.  
The dividend behaviour of the Romanian listed companies seems to be influenced by a 
number of variables, which do not differ substantially from what is common in the 
developed countries. The fiscal policy does not play a major role in the dividend 
decision making process. This result can be explained in two ways. Firstly, there is a 
hypothesis that fiscal policy is neutral. This neutrality can also be interpreted as an 
impossibility to change the behaviour of companies. Secondly, the results can be 
explained by the large number of companies that retain the entire incomes and do not 
pay dividends. Unfortunately, we can suppose that the regulations regarding taxes 
were implemented too late to improve the mechanisms of corporate finance.  
However, the dividend payout policy was modified at the moment when the regulations 
related to the tax treatment of incomes changed, in 2005. In this context, we noticed 
that the Romanian companies have changed their behaviour only in this year, and not 
in 2000, too. This reaction can be a clue for the maturing of the Romanian economy 
from 2000 to 2005.  
The dividend policy seems to have other causes. Here, the ownership structure 
appears to be very important. Moreover, the dividend policy of the Romanian 
companies is positively related to the gross incomes, and negatively related to the 
dividends from the previous year.  
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Appendix 1 
A brief presentation of income taxation regulations in Romania  
In Romania, over the period 1998-2006, the income tax regulations had many 
changes, as presented in Table A1. Table A2 presents the tax incentives of incomes 
for the same period.  
Table A1 
The evolution of income taxation in Romania (1998-2006) 
Year  Income tax rates 
1998 – 1999  •  38% - general case; 
•  60% (38% + 22%) for gambling and night clubs. This rate was applied 
to the share of taxable incomes corresponding to these activities in 
total income
6; 
•  44.2% (38% + 6.2%) for foreign legal person, through a permanent 
residence in Romania; 
•  25% for tax payers that obtain at least 80% from their incomes from 
agriculture. 
2000 - April 
2001
7 
•  25% - general case; 
•  50% (25% + 25%) for gambling and night clubs. This rate was applied 
to the share of taxable incomes corresponding to these activities in 
total income; 
• 10% for any equity increase from retain earnings, excepting legal 
reserves and positive differences from assets re-evaluations.   
April 2001 – 
June 2002
8 
•  25% -general case; 
•  50% (25% + 25%) for gambling and night clubs. This rate was applied 
to the share of taxable incomes corresponding to these activities in 
total income; 
• 5% for any equity increase from retain earnings, excepting legal 
reserves and positive differences from assets re-evaluations; 
•  5% for taxable income from export activities
9. 




•  25% - general case; 
•  5% for  taxable income from free trade zones; 
•  6% for taxable income from export activities; 
•  maximum between 5% applied to income from gambling, night club, 
disco and casino activities and 25% of taxable income from these 
activities. 
2003
11  •  25% - general case; 
•  5% for  taxable income from free trade zones; 
•  12.5% for taxable income from export income share in total income; 
                                                           
6 According to G.O. No. 40/1998. 
7 According to G.O. No. 217/1999.  
8 According to Law No. 189/2001. 
9 Starting to 2002 incomes taxation quota for exports activities is 6%. 
10 According to Law No. 414/2002.  Income Taxation Regulation 
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Year  Income tax rates 
•  maximum between 5% applied to income from gambling, night club, 
disco and casino activities and 25% of taxable income from these 
activities. 
2004
12  •  25% - general case; 
•  5% for  taxable income from free trade zones;; 
•  10% for taxable income from export activities; 
•  maximum between 5% applied to income from gambling, night club, 
disco and casino activities and 25% of taxable income from these 
activities. 
2005-2006
13  •  16% - general case; 
•  maximum between 5% applied to income from gambling, night club, 




Tax incentives for companies’ incomes in Romania (1998-2006) 
Year Tax  incentives 
1997 - 1998
14  •  for companies that employed at least 3% handicapped persons, if 
they had more than 250 employees15; 
• 50% reduction for companies that obtained foreign currency 
income from export16; 
•  50% reduction for income allocated in the current fiscal year for 
technology or extension of activity, or for investments in 
environment protection17. 
1999  •  for companies which employed at least 3% handicapped persons, if 
they had more than 250 employees; 
•  50% reduction for income allocated in the current fiscal year for 
technology or extension of activity, or for investments in 
environment protection. 
2000 – present  •  Until 2002, the reduction with 50% of the income tax, for the part 
allocated for investments in tangible and intangible assets, in the 
same year that they were obtained. Moreover, some tax incentives 
were used in some special cases: for small and medium size 
enterprises (for employing handicapped persons or for those which 
increased the employees’ number), for investments with a large 
impact on economy, for investments in under-developed areas etc. 
                                                                                                                                                           
11 According to Law No. 414/2002. 
12 According to Law No. 571/2003, representing the Romanian Fiscal Code. 
13 According to G.O. No. 138/2004. 
14According to Law No. 73/1996. 
15 For monthly reductions. 
16 Monthly reduction, cumulated from the beginning of the year. 
17 Monthly reduction, cumulated from the beginning of the year. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Appendix 2  
Table A3: Descriptive Statistics 










  MIR 
Mean -0.23  0.06  11.15  0.19  0.22 0.46 0.18  1.03  1.13 
Median 0.00  0.12  13.48  0.19  0.18 0.40 0.24  1.04  0.73 
 Maximum  24.86  5.76  25.41  4.00 2.21 4.72 2.11  1.08  2.96 
Minimum -23.50  -3.61  0.00  -3.65 -2.35 -4.99  -13.33  0.95  0.49 
Std. Dev.  5.46  0.93  6.46  0.92 0.48 0.76 0.86  0.03  0.86 
 
Appendix 3 
Table A4: Fixed Effects 
Firms Equ.(1)  Equ.(2) Equ.(3) Equ.(4) Equ.(5) Equ.(6) 
ALR   42.8987  20.7522  22.8645  15.6144  65.7690  9.9855 
ARM   41.1767  13.9294  15.9600  10.6681  59.3891  6.8870 
ARS   33.3401 7.6438 18.1386 2.9990 53.4967 1.1442 
ASA   41.5626  16.6161  19.2168  12.6250  61.6305  8.3660 
ATB       18.8274  12.3396  61.3986  7.2177 
ASP   41.0829  16.5671  19.2152  12.6004  61.0527  7.8913 
AZO   42.5053  18.3700  21.7336  13.6768  63.5161  9.7997 
BRD   42.1632  22.0313  24.2993  16.1625  67.3236  11.6092 
BRM   33.5924 7.9352 18.1911 3.5645 53.9166 1.3833 
CBC   21.3267  -6.8763  3.8857 -10.8133  39.0199  -12.5660 
CMF   41.7538  15.8015  18.1660  12.2735  61.0394  8.3072 
CMP   30.8422 5.1534 15.4304 0.8471 50.9578 -1.7769 
CPR   29.6249  0.8082  3.5037  -2.1089  46.3942  -5.2556 
CRB   32.7670 6.4238 16.6489 2.3294 52.0720 -0.1271 
EFO    36.8581  8.0209  6.9941    
ELJ    34.0308 8.0209 10.8053 4.5835 52.7689 0.3830 
ENP   24.4175  -6.1237  3.9857  -10.4187  40.0411  -8.5866 
EPT   45.9981 9.6278 10.4546 6.1255 55.5485  10.3519 
EXC   33.3958 8.5730 11.4377 4.8977 53.1547  0.001 
IMP   39.0975  13.6043  16.3617  10.5402  59.1064  5.7132 
INX       17.6422  11.0122  60.1290   
MEF   42.4436  16.5464  17.3139  12.2533  62.1551  6.9043 
OIL   43.2871  17.3455  18.0964  12.7371  63.5426  7.7137 
OLT   41.9999  16.3721  17.3315  12.3392  61.2338  7.2481 
PEI   41.9028  17.1676  19.7540  13.0718  62.2655  8.4933 
PPL    33.2156 6.4935 16.4876 2.3397 52.7461 0.0864 
PTR    28.6112    -1.9887    
RBR   42.0703  15.6267  13.2598 8.0601 58.4006 3.9331 
SCD   25.8880  1.8894  3.8623  -2.1689  46.5523  -7.7101 
SIF1   41.6496  16.5542  18.8827  12.5212  61.9422  8.4668 
SIF2   41.9987  19.3606  22.0491  14.4837  64.3431  9.7946  Income Taxation Regulation 
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 1/2009   93
   
Firms Equ.(1)  Equ.(2) Equ.(3) Equ.(4) Equ.(5) Equ.(6) 
SIF3   41.9901  19.2338  21.9092  14.4733  64.2535  9.7978 
SIF4   41.2254  18.6866  22.2444  14.7059  64.5047  9.9462 
SIF5   42.0123  19.2220  21.8648  14.4802  64.2131  9.6672 
SNO   39.9187  14.3887  16.7375  10.5796  59.4925  6.4217 
SNP   35.0734  3.7623  5.7099  11.6920  48.8090  -8.3052 
SRT   32.4522 5.1738 13.8822 1.4982 50.7576 -0.6403 
STZ    30.3816 4.5142 14.9140 0.0641 50.2027 -1.6606 
TMB   33.8219 8.6870 18.6532 4.4701 54.5642 1.2326 
UAM   30.3956 2.8014 12.9715 -1.0498 48.7029 -2.5806 
ZIM    34.4153 9.4342 15.3564 4.7531 54.6100 2.1329 
 